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WATER UNDER THE BRIDGE:
CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT IN BRITAIN AND THE
OECD
Peter Robinson
It is widely assumed in the public debate that the pace of change in the
structure of employment in the industrialised countries is accelerating.
At an industry level, jobs in the primary industries and in
manufacturing are being replaced by jobs in the ‘services’ sector.  At
an occupational level, blue collar, manual jobs are being replaced by
white collar, managerial, professional and technical, or service and
sales jobs.  It is assumed that this is occurring at a more rapid rate than
in previous decades.  These structural changes in employment,
whatever their source, might in turn be causing imbalances in the
labour market and structural unemployment.
The aim of the paper is to look at the nature of employment
change in a number of OECD countries to see to what extent these
assumptions are valid.  Specifically, the paper seeks to illuminate the
answers to the following questions:
a. Has the change in the structure of employment by industry or
occupation been accelerating?
b. Has the structure of employment by industry or occupation been
changing at different rates in different countries?
c. Where are the net new jobs being generated and does this pattern
vary across countries?
d. In particular, is the pattern of job generation different in the US
when compared with some European countries?  This might
throw light on why the US labour market has generated a much
faster increase in overall employment rates when compared with
the European countries. 
e. What are the implications of employment change for the demand
for higher qualifications or skills?
f. And finally, are the data good enough to fully answer these
questions?
2This is an ambitious agenda, and the final point relating to data
limitations will, of course, put a limit on the conclusions which can be
reached.
The first section of the paper takes a broad-brush look at changes
in the structure of employment in 10 OECD countries.  The second
section looks in greater detail at changes in the UK labour market.  The
third section looks at changes in the occupational structure of
employment in the US and France when compared with Britain.  As far
as possible the US data have been made to conform with the British
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) for this analysis.  A key
premise underlying the paper is that the occupations in the SOC closely
correspond to different levels of employment by skill, so that changes
in the occupational structure of employment can be taken to proxy
changes in the net demand for labour by skill level.  The fourth section
looks at the implications of employment change for the demand for
higher qualifications.  Finally, the conclusions of the paper are drawn
together.  In part, this paper follows up on work reported in Robinson
(1994) and it is written with reference to the analysis offered by the
OECD (1994a) and in the light of work by Machin (1996) and others
looking at changes in the structure of employment.
1. THE STRUCTURE OF EMPLOYMENT IN 10 OECD
COUNTRIES.
Initially, the analysis focuses on 10 countries (Table 1).  These
countries were picked primarily because it was possible to obtain data
on employment by occupation over a sufficient period of time which
could be reasonably relied upon.  The selection includes all the G-7
countries except Italy, three smaller Northern European countries
(Norway, Sweden and Finland) and one Southern European country
(Spain).  
Table 1 presents some summary data on the unemployment rates
and civilian employment-population ratios of these countries over a
3period from the early 1980s to the early 1990s.  The exact dates chosen
for each country relate to the availability of reasonably consistent data
on employment by occupation.  The countries are ranked according to
their employment-population ratios in the early 1990s though, with the
exception of Germany, this is reasonably well correlated with a ranking
by unemployment rates in the early 1990s.
Japan has had the best record both in terms of maintaining
relatively low unemployment and increasing its employment-
population ratio.  It is the only OECD country not to have seen a
decline in the employment-population ratio for men over the period.
The three Scandinavian countries maintained relatively low
unemployment rates and high employment-population ratios in the
1980s but, in the case of Sweden and especially Finland, have suffered
major reverses in the early 1990s.  The US record has been relatively
good, with a moderate average unemployment rate and a rising
employment-population ratio.  Canada’s record has been poorer.  The
dates chosen for the UK, which span two censuses, rather flatter British
performance.  If the period 1979-93 had been chosen rather than 1981-
91, it would reveal a sharp rise in unemployment and a fall in the
employment-population ratio.  Finally, both France and Spain have
very high levels of unemployment and particularly low employment-
population ratios.
It is also important to emphasise the gender differences between
the countries in Table 1.  Across the OECD as a whole, unemployment
rates are higher for women than for men, a point often neglected by
Anglo-American economists heavily focused on their own countries’
labour markets where the reverse has generally been the case.  Indeed,
in this sense the sample of 10 countries chosen here is
unrepresentative, in that there are more countries with higher male
unemployment rates which is not the case for the OECD as a whole.
Where unemployment rates for men are higher than those for women,
the gap is smaller than when the reverse is true.  This can be seen by
comparing France and the UK in Table 1.  The concentration of
unemployment amongst women in France and Spain is especially
4pronounced, as is the much lower employment-population ratios for
women in these two countries.
It is important to set this context because we are interested in
changes in the structure of employment not for their own sake, but
because such changes might help throw light on the overall pattern of
employment and unemployment outlined in Table 1.
Table 2 outlines the distribution of employment by industry for
the 10 countries, with the industry data aggregated up to six categories.
The countries are ranked according to the annualised percentage point
decline in employment in the primary and manufacturing industries
over the period in question (the final column1).  Such a ranking reveals
a more modest decline in the share of employment in these ‘traditional’
industries in Japan and Germany, countries which also stand out in
terms of still having a much higher proportion of employment in
manufacturing in the early 1990s than in other OECD countries.
Britain does not particularly stand out in Table 2; the rate of decline
in employment in the traditional industries over the period is somewhat
faster than the average, but the overall structure of employment by the
early 1990s does not look out of line with many other OECD
countries.
Table 3 shows the rate of decline in employment in the primary
and manufacturing industries over three time periods.  The overall
pattern reveals no sign of any significant acceleration in the rate of
change in the 1980s when compared with the 1970s.  The same
conclusion was reached by the OECD, using more formal measures of
the pace of structural change as measured by sectoral employment
shifts (page 15, OECD, 1994a).  Interestingly, the OECD chose to
highlight the UK as the only country where there was evidence of a
greater rate of change in the 1980s when compared with the 1970s.
The OECD went on to point out, however, that this was confined only
to the early 1980s.  The pace of change in the mid-late 1980s was not
out of line with historical experience.  Table 3 confirms this.  From
1979-84, Britain did witness a sharp acceleration in the rate of decline
in the share of employment in the traditional industries, and its
5experience at this time was out of line with other countries.  But after
1984 the pace of change slowed down again.
By the late 1980s and early 1990s countries such as Finland and
Spain were witnessing the kind of sharp falls in the share of
employment in the primary and manufacturing industries which Britain
had witnessed in the early 1980s.  Another interesting feature of Table
3 is that Japan appeared to experience its most rapid period of
structural adjustment in the 1970s, an observation which is also
confirmed by the OECD.  For most of the other countries in Table 3,
the 1980s saw a pace of change little different from the 1970s.
Employment is shifting from the primary and manufacturing
industries towards the ‘services’ sector throughout the OECD.  But is
this the low paid, low skill services sector, or the high paid, high skill
sector? 
Table 2 breaks the services sector down into three broad
groupings and shows that for all 10 countries the growth in the share
of employment is occurring primarily in the public and social services
and in business and financial services, and not in the distribution,
hotels and catering and transport industries.  The share of employment
in these latter industries, where lower paid and lower skilled
employment is concentrated, is not increasing significantly in any
country except Spain.  The sectors which are growing – public, social,
business and financial services – provide more highly paid and skilled
jobs.  So in itself the shift from ‘industry’ to ‘services’ is not altering
the structure of employment adversely in the sense of being associated
with a shift to lower quality jobs.
However, this is about as far as an analysis based on industry can
get us.  This is because there are significant shifts occurring in the
structure of employment by occupation within industries, broadly
speaking away from blue collar to white collar jobs.  This has been
emphasised by Machin (1996) in his analysis of UK manufacturing
industry, where he shows the process to have been ongoing over the
whole post-war period.  Thus data on employment change by
occupation should be more illuminating than data on employment
6change by industry.  
Ideally, one would want to construct a matrix of employment by
industry and occupation and track changes over time.  Such a matrix
for the UK for 1981 and 1991 is presented in section 2 below and
similar data for the US is referred to in section 3.  However,
constructing consistent matrices across time for an individual country
is very problematic, given continuous changes in the industrial and
occupational classifications of employment.  Comparisons across
countries are even more difficult, for the same reasons which are
explored in this section looking at employment change by occupation
only.
Table 4 presents data for the 10 countries on employment change
by occupation over the period from the early 1980s to the early 1990s.
It employs the International Standard Classification of Occupations
(ISCO–1968) as used by the ILO and OECD.  Countries are ranked
according to the annualised percentage point decline in the share of
manual or blue collar employment (final two columns of the table).
The rankings, unsurprisingly, are similar to those in Table 2.  This, of
course, is because the decline in employment in the primary and
manufacturing industries involves primarily the loss of manual jobs.
The figures for the US refer to the period 1983-93 (rather than 1981-91
in Table 2) because the occupational classification of employment
changed significantly in 1983, rendering comparisons with time periods
before 1983 problematic, of which more in section 3.
Over the period from the early 1980s to the early 1990s, Table 4
shows that the rate of decline in the share of blue collar employment
in the US was significantly slower than in the other countries over
similar periods of time.  Even more so than in Table 2, the pace of
change in the UK is not out of line with other countries.  Indeed, the
UK's position is very much in the middle of the Table.
However, the trend in blue collar or manual employment is about
the only comparison which can be relied upon in Table 4.  A quick
glance at such categories as (2) managers and administrators or (4) sales
occupations, suggests that the data are not comparing like with like. 
7In several of the countries in the Table, such as Japan and
Germany, the managerial/administrative category (2) includes only
senior managers and administrators.  By contrast the British
classification, for example, also includes many intermediate managerial
and administrative jobs which the other countries would classify in
column (3) as clerical employment.  The British classification also
includes the managers or owners of retailing establishments whereas
other countries classify these in column (4) as sales workers.  Sweden
no longer has a separate category for managers and administrators, but
includes some as professionals (1) and most as clerical staff (3).
Table 4 cannot be relied upon to compare the levels of
employment by occupation across countries, and problems arise too in
comparing rates of change.  In the US, Britain, Canada and France the
data on clerical employment (3) seem broadly comparable and all show
a slight decline in the share of clerical jobs in total employment.  The
other countries include in column (3) many intermediate managerial
and administrative staff, and the growth in the share of employment in
this classification in Germany, Japan and Sweden probably reflects
growth in these kinds of jobs, which in the US, Britain, Canada and
France would show up as an increase in the share of employment in the
managerial and administrative occupations (column 2). 
These uncertainties in the data cloud the issue of whether the
share of routine clerical employment is declining or not in all the
OECD countries, though it is worth emphasising that in none of the
countries in Table 4 is there any sign of any really sharp decline in the
1980s.
However, to the extent that Table 4 can be relied upon to look at
changes within each country then an important pattern does emerge.
Nearly all the increased share of ‘white collar’ employment is in the
professional and technical and managerial and administrative
occupations and not in the sales or services categories.  In other words,
manual jobs are being replaced primarily by more highly paid and
highly skilled jobs at the top of the occupational spectrum and not by
low paid, low skilled jobs.  This of course matches the trends observed
8in Table 2 where the growth in employment in the service industries
was mainly concentrated in the public and social services and business
and financial services sectors where employment is heavily weighted
towards professional, managerial and technical jobs, and not in the
distribution, hotels and catering sector where lower paid, lower skilled
sales and service jobs are concentrated.  Spain is a partial exception in
both Tables 2 and 4 in witnessing a modest growth in the share of
employment in both the distribution, hotels and catering industries and
in sales and service employment.
There is no strong evidence in Table 4 of any strong
‘bipolarisation’ of employment, that is a decline in manual jobs and
their replacement by a nearly equal mixture of both high skill and low
skill jobs.  Rather, most of the increased share of employment is
coming at the top end of the occupational distribution.
Unfortunately the absence of reliable data over time, even for
some of the industrialised countries in this analysis, means that it is not
possible to look at the rate of change in the occupational distribution
of employment, comparing the 1980s with the 1970s, as was done for
industries in Table 3.  However, in sections 2 and 3 data on
employment change by occupation over two or more decades for the
UK, US and France will be presented.
Figures 1 and 2 present the data on the structure of employment
by industry (Figure 1) and occupation (Figure 2) for the 10 OECD
countries for the early 1990s in a different way.  The share of
employment in each industry or occupation is presented as a
proportion of the civilian employment-population ratio for each
country.  The Figures are trying to throw light on where the countries
with high employment-population ratios have all their extra jobs, when
compared with the countries with low employment-population ratios.
Or to put it another way, if, for example, countries such as France and
Spain wished to increase employment to match the high levels achieved
in the US, what types of jobs would they have to expand?
From Figure 1 it can be seen that, with the exceptions of Germany
and Japan, most countries have a similar proportion of their adult
9populations employed in ‘industry’, including construction.  The
position of the construction industry is worth pointing out here in that,
along with transport, it is an industry which is not in secular decline
and which provides many blue collar jobs.  When comparing, for
example, France and the United States, the latter’s significantly higher
employment-population ratio is due to a higher level of employment
across the ‘services’ sector, in business and financial services, in public
and social services and in distribution, hotels and catering.  So an
expansion of employment in ‘services’, brought about for example by
a liberalisation of product markets, would not necessarily generate
employment in low paid service sectors.  And the creation of
employment even in some relatively ‘low skill’ service sectors might be
necessary in many continental European countries, given the heavy
concentration of unemployment in these countries amongst women
(Table 1) and young people, who tend to find work disproportionately
in sectors such as distribution, hotels and catering.
On the other hand, perhaps not too much should be made of the
concentration of employment growth in many European countries in
the public sector (as does the OECD, 1994a).  Most public sector
employment is encompassed in the public/social services category of
the industrial classification used in Table 2 and Figure 1.  The US has
seen significant growth in the share of employment in this sector (Table
2) and has a very high level of employment overall in these services
(Figure 1), including areas such as health and social care and
education.  That in the US many of these jobs show up as private sector
employment, financed for example by deductions from workers’ gross
incomes for health insurance payments, rather than, as in Europe,
showing up as public sector employment, financed by taxes taken out
of workers’ gross incomes, is not perhaps as important as is sometimes
emphasised.
Figure 2 is less useful in throwing light on cross-country
differences in employment-population ratios and unemployment,
because of the lack of comparability in the occupational data.
Comparing the US and France, the European country appears to have
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a significantly lower proportion of its adult population employed in
lower level service and sales occupations, but also a significantly lower
proportion employed in the high skill managerial, professional and
technical occupations.  With aggregate unemployment high and with
unemployment in France disproportionately concentrated on young
people and women, such continental European countries should not be
reluctant to see an expansion across the board in employment in the
‘services’ sector.
2. EMPLOYMENT CHANGE IN THE UK: ACCELERATION
OR DECELERATION?
Uncertainty about the data on employment by occupation makes it
important to look more carefully at changes within particular countries.
In this section the nature of employment change in Britain in recent
decades is explored to see whether there is evidence of an acceleration
in the rate of change in the structure of employment.
Figure 3 is taken from Robinson (1994) and uses Census data on
employment by occupation over the period 1951-91.  The data are
aggregated to five broad occupational categories and reveal the steady
decline in manual employment over time and its replacement largely by
managerial, professional and technical jobs.  The share of employment
in sales and service occupations shows little change.  Clerical
employment was an increasing share of the total over the period 1951-
81, before its slight decline in the 1980s.  This is the only break in
trend.  The decline in the share of manual employment appears to have
proceeded at a steady pace through the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.  The
effects of the Thatcher recession, with its associated sharp fall in
employment in manufacturing and for manual workers, is partly hidden
by this analysis as the 1981 Census falls right in the middle of the
recession.  Nevertheless, the absence of any sharp break in trend in a
run of data going back 40 years is impressive.
Table 5 shows in more detail the structure of employment by
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industry for the UK over the period 1971-96.  This Table picks out the
impact of the Thatcher recession and the especially sharp fall in
manufacturing employment in the early 1980s.  By contrast, the
recession of the early 1990s saw a much less dramatic fall in the share
of manufacturing employment.  Rather, the sharp contrast with past
experience is the decline in the share of employment in construction
due to the collapse in the property market.  Construction is a heavily
cyclical industry and one can expect a recovery in its share of
employment at some point in the 1990s.  The share of employment of
business and financial services also grew less strongly in the first half
of the 1990s.  Overall, the rate of change in employment by industry
was less pronounced in the early 1990s when compared with the early
1980s.  It is clearly the case that the early 1990s recession was different
from the early 1980s recession, particularly in terms of its lesser impact
on manufacturing.
The evidence suggests that the rate of change in the structure of
employment by industry, having accelerated in the early 1980s, has
now fallen back down to the kind of rate of change seen in previous
decades.  In 1979 it could be argued that Britain was out of line in
having an abnormally high share of employment in manufacturing,
reflecting overmanning.  Having by the early 1990s converged on the
OECD average, there is less scope for further dramatic shifts in the
employment structure.
The data in Table 5 reflect two different data sources and a
change in the industrial classification of employment.  This should not
invalidate the analysis based on comparing the rates of change over the
time periods shown.  Table 6 shows changes in the structure of
employment in Britain by occupation over the period 1979-96.  In
1991 the occupational classification in the UK changed significantly,
rendering comparisons across time difficult.  The Standard
Occupational Classification was designed specifically so that the
occupational groupings brought together jobs with similar requirements
in terms of qualifications, training and experience.  The ranking of the
occupational categories from 1-9 was meant to reflect the progression
12
of the occupations from those requiring a higher level of qualifications,
training and/or experience down to those requiring a much lower level
of skill or experience.
Table 6 tries to provide a consistent series with the data for 1984
and 1990 reclassified to the post-1991 SOC, using a mapping supplied
by the Institute of Employment Research at the University of Warwick.
Table 6 would suggest no acceleration in the rate of change in
employment by occupation in the early 1990s when compared with the
early 1980s.  The share of manual employment has been declining at
the same rate over the two time periods, while the share of managerial,
professional and technical employment has been increasing at a slightly
slower rate in the early 1990s.
Critically, the decline in manual employment in the early 1990s
was concentrated on skilled (craft) manual work, reflecting in part the
problems of the construction industry highlighted in Table 5.  Even in
the mid-to-late 1980s skilled manual employment was losing share at
about the same rate as unskilled (other occupations) manual
employment.  Semi-skilled manual employment (operatives) has been
declining at a slower rate.  In other words, it is strictly misleading to
talk about a decline in unskilled employment in Britain.  It is manual
employment which is in decline, with skilled manual employment
declining at at least the same rate as unskilled manual employment, but
with semi-skilled employment declining less sharply.
The share of clerical employment has been declining at a
somewhat faster rate in the early 1990s when compared with the early
1980s, though it is notable that during the period of expanding
employment in the mid-to-late 1980s the share of clerical employment
increased marginally again.  The share of employment in the personal
services has been rising at a significantly faster rate in the early 1990s.
Table 7 reports results from the Institute of Employment Research
utilising the post-1991 SOC, and looking at the changes in employment
over the period 1971-91 alongside estimates of the future structure of
employment projected to 2001.  The OECD has argued that projections
at this level of aggregation have been reasonably accurate in the past,
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though attempts to project the future occupational structure of
employment at a lower level of aggregation have often been
unsuccessful (OECD, 1994b).  If they can be relied upon, these
projections suggest a slowing down in the rate of change in
employment by occupation when comparing the 1990s with the 1980s,
and in particular they show a slower fall in the share of manual
employment.  As these projections are referred to extensively in the
policy debate in the UK these results are of significance.
In Section 1 the value of looking at a matrix which presented data
by industry and occupation simultaneously was emphasised.  Table 8
presents such a matrix for the UK from the 1991 Census using the six
broad industrial categories already familiar from earlier tables and the
nine occupational categories from the Standard Occupational
Classification (SOC).  Table 9 presents the same data from the 1981
Census, using the mapping provided by the Institute of Employment
Research to enable one to re-arrange the occupational data for 1981
using the SOC.  A comparison of Tables 8 and 9 allows for a much
finer analysis of the changes in the structure of employment over the
period 1981-91 in the UK.  Table 10 gives examples of typical jobs
within each of the main cells as a guide to interpretation.
Unsurprisingly it is the cells in the top right hand corner of the
Tables, covering managerial, professional and technical employment in
the services industries, which show the major gains in terms of the share
of total employment.  The cells in the bottom left hand corner,
covering manual jobs in the primary and manufacturing industries,
show the major losses in share.  This would paint a portrait of a steady
increase in the share of employment requiring higher qualifications and
skills and/or experience.  However, in the centre and bottom of the
Tables there are a number of cells representing ‘service’ occupations
and some manual work in the construction and service (especially
transport) industries where the share of employment is also expanding
modestly or is remaining steady.
As Machin (1996) has pointed out, within the shrinking
manufacturing sector there has been a shift in employment away from
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blue collar, manual jobs towards white collar jobs.  This occured
steadily over the whole period 1948-90, with a slight acceleration
associated with the early 1980s recession.  Within this shift towards
white collar jobs, Machin identifies a significant increase in the
employment share of managers and professional staff. 
Tables 8 and 9 confirm this.  Managerial employment in
manufacturing actually increased its share of overall employment
between 1981-91, despite the sharp fall in manufacturing employment,
and it is this shift to a more management-intensive employment
structure which dominates the trend identified by Machin.  Indeed, the
overall trend of an increased share of white collar employment
disguises the fact that clerical employment in manufacturing fell
sharply over this period and, indeed, at a faster rate proportionately
than manual employment.  Within the category of manual employment
in manufacturing, skilled manual (craft) employment has fallen at a
faster rate than semi-skilled (operatives) manual employment, while
unskilled manual (other) employment shows the sharpest decline. 
The rising share of managerial and administrative employment is
common to all industrial sectors.  Indeed, most of the expansion in
employment in this occupational category has occured as a result of
increased employment within industries.  By contrast, the growth in
employment in the professional and associate professional and
technical occupations has occurred mainly as a result of changes in the
structure of employment between industries, that is, the rising share of
employment in the business and financial and public and social services
where professional and technical employment is especially
concentrated.  More professional and technical staff have also been
employed within each industry.  The public and social services also
have a high concentration of employment in the personal and
protective services occupations, which has been the only occupational
category embracing some less skilled work to have expanded its share
of employment.  The sharp fall in the share of clerical employment in
manufacturing over the period 1981-91 was partly offset by an increase
in clerical employment in the business and financial and public and
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social services.  However, the share of clerical and secretarial
employment fell in every industrial sector.
The share of both skilled and semi- or unskilled manual
employment fell sharply over the period in the primary and
manufacturing industries.  A comparison of Tables 8 and 9 also shows
a fall in unskilled manual employment in the public and social services,
which probably in part reflects the impact of contracting-out in
slimming the workforce in areas such as refuse collection.  However, in
the construction and the distribution and transport industries there was
no significant decline in manual employment as a proportion of total
employment.  This is an important point to emphasise.  In 1991 manual
employment in these two industries accounted for about one-in-seven
of all jobs in the economy, a proportion largely unchanged from 1981.
These jobs accounted for about one-in-five of all the employment
opportunities available for men in 1991 (Table 11).  Construction is a
very cyclical industry, but neither it nor the distribution and transport
industries are in secular decline.  By 1991 for every nine workers
employed in manual jobs in the primary and manufacturing industries,
there were 11 workers employed in manual jobs in construction and
the services industries.  In 1981 these two broad sectors employed
equal numbers of manual workers.
 Tables 11 and 12 show matrices of employment by industry and
occupation for men and women respectively in 1991.  It shows the
expected pattern of the heavy concentration of men in the manual
occupations and in managerial/administrative positions, and the heavy
concentration of women in the clerical, service and sales occupations.
45 per cent of men in 1991 held manual jobs and of these over half –
25 percentage points – were employed outside of the primary and
manufacturing industries.  Overall, a similar proportion of women as
men were employed in the professional and associate professional and
technical occupations, though with women concentrated in the public
and social services as teachers and nurses, for example.
In order to throw more light on the issue of whether the changes
in the structure of employment represent a trend towards better paid or
16
lower paid jobs, Table 13 and 14 show the average earnings for men
and women respectively in the main industry-occupation cells where
employment is concentrated.  These tables might also help illuminate
whether sharp differences in pay are likely to make it difficult for
workers displaced from one cell to find acceptable jobs in other cells,
that is employment which does not require too sharp a fall in pay.
For men in skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled manual jobs there
seem to be few sharp differences in pay across industries.  Generally,
pay in the primary industries and in the public and social services is
somewhat below average, but there few differences in pay across the
manufacturing, construction and distribution/transport industries.
Employment in business and financial services offers the highest
average pay for most occupations and has been the fastest expanding
area of employment.  For men and women there are few sharp
differences across industries in pay for clerical employees, except that
the business and financial services offer the highest rates.  The sharpest
differences in pay across any one occupation occur in the
managerial/administrative category, with much higher levels of pay for
managers in the business and financial services, and much lower levels
of pay for managers in the distribution, hotels and restaurants sector.
This category of the SOC covers a wide range of employment from
corporate and financial managers through to shopkeepers.
For men, most full time jobs in the ‘service’ occupations tend to
offer lower pay than most manual jobs.  For women, however, any
differences are less obvious.  Women displaced from manual jobs who
can find full time employment in the service occupations would not on
average have to take a significant pay cut.  However, men displaced
from skilled or semi-skilled manual jobs in the primary or
manufacturing industries would on average suffer a significant
reduction in pay if they took a full time job in the service occupations.
On the other hand, such men would not have to take a significant pay
cut if they found another full time manual job in the service industries.
Semi- or unskilled manual workers might be better able to make this
transition across industry sectors as the skills required of a labourer or
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a driver will differ little across sectors.  Ironically, it might be the
skilled manual workers who could find it more difficult to cross an
industry boundary if their craft skill is too specialised to a particular
industry.
As noted earlier, it is the cells in the top right hand corner of the
matrices covering managerial, professional and technical employment
in the service industries which show the major gains in the share of
employment, and cells in the bottom left hand corner which show the
major losses.  Pay in the expanding cells is on average about two-thirds
higher for men than in the contracting cells and nearly twice as high for
women.  A more formal analysis of trends in employment by
occupation and by pay is contained in the next section, where UK and
US experience is compared.
3. CONVERGENCE?  EMPLOYMENT CHANGE IN THE
UK, US AND FRANCE COMPARED
In section one it was shown how ILO data from different countries on
changes in the structure of employment by occupation were not readily
comparable.  In this section data from the US are re-ordered as far as
possible to fit the UK SOC in order to compare levels of, and changes
across time in, the occupational structure of employment.
Firstly, Tables 15 and 16 look at changes across time in the
occupational structure of employment for the US and France
respectively, using national data as would be represented in the
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-1968).
The interpretation of data for the US is rendered problematic by the
sharp change in the occupational classification of employment which
took place in that country in 1983.  Table 15 compares the change in
employment by occupation over the period 1973-82, using the old
classification, with the change over the period 1983-93, using the new
classification.  It reveals a clear deceleration in the rate of change in
employment by occupation in the latter period in comparison with the
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earlier period.  In particular, the decline in the share of blue-collar
employment slowed down significantly.  The only break in trend was
the modest decline in the share of clerical employment between 1983-
93 when compared with a modest increase in the earlier period.
This conclusion, that the rate of change in employment by
occupation shows signs of a deceleration in the US, is in contrast to the
findings reported by the OECD (1994a, pages 11-13).  It also conflicts
with the findings of Berman et al (1994) who detected signs of a slight
acceleration in the rate of increase in the share of white collar
employment in US manufacturing in the 1980s. 
The OECD detected signs of a slight acceleration in the shift of
employment towards white collar jobs and away from manual
employment, when comparing the two periods 1972-79 and 1979-90.
However, in comparing these two periods the OECD does not seem to
have taken account of the change in the occupational classification in
1983.  Another important reason for the different results is that the
period 1973-82 incorporates two quite major recessions in the US,
while the period 1983-93 included only one relatively minor recession.
The time periods chosen by the OECD split up the two major
recessions.
Berman et al compared two periods, 1973-79 and 1979-87,
similar to those used by the OECD, and also do not seem to have taken
into account the change in the occupational classification.  The
acceleration in change noted by Berman et al is small enough to be
wiped out by small alterations to the data brought about by a change
in the classification.  Even these authors urge putting the skill
upgrading in the 1980s into historical context, given the evidence of a
sharp shift towards white collar employment in US manufacturing in
the 1950s. 
The arguments presented here highlight a critical point of this
paper.  The recessions of the mid-1970s and early 1980s in the US and
in Britain saw significant jolts to the structure of employment.  But
since the early 1980s the pace of change may have slowed, even taking
into account the recessions of the early 1990s in both countries.
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When the rate of decline in the share of manual employment in
the US over the period 1973-82 reported in Table 15 is compared with
the rates of decline in manual employment in other countries in the
1980s, reported in Table 4, it can be seen that the rates are very similar.
For example, the rate of decline in blue collar employment in Britain
between 1981-91 is almost exactly equal to the rate of decline in the
US between 1973-82.  This is suggestive that some European countries
in the 1980s were witnessing the kind of changes experienced by the
US in the 1970s.
Another important point to register about the data in Table 15 is
that it shows manual employment being replaced primarily by
managerial, professional and technical employment.  In neither period
is there any significant growth in the share of the sales and service
occupations.  The American labour market has not seen a sharp
increase in the proportion of people working in ‘low skill’ service
employment, but has seen a sharp increase in the share of ‘high skill’
managerial, professional and technical employment.  This is very
different from what is perceived to have occurred in much popular
discussion of the so-called American  ‘jobs machine’.
Table 15 is based on data from the US Current Population Survey
(CPS), a household survey similar to the Labour Force Surveys carried
out in the UK and other European countries.  It is thus measuring the
proportion of people employed in different occupations.  The
Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) record firm level data on
the number of jobs in the economy and do record an above average
increase in some ‘low skill’ service jobs (Rosenthal, 1995).  The two
sources are reconciled in part by consideration of the increased number
of people holding two jobs, most of whom are in low skill employment.
Also, the OES does not include self-employment where the growth
appears to be disproportionately concentrated in the managerial,
professional and technical occupations.
The US Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) constructs a detailed
matrix of employment by industry and occupation similar in concept
to the simple matrices presented in Table 8 for the UK.  However, the
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US matrices are constructed using data from the OES and therefore
suffer from the two weaknesses discussed in the last paragraph.
For the period 1983-93, Table 15 also includes a disaggregation
of employment change within the blue collar occupations into skilled
and unskilled manual workers and transport operatives.  It shows a
significantly faster decline in the share of unskilled manual
employment when compared with skilled manual employment, but no
decline at all in the share of transport operatives.  Once again this
makes the point that there are areas of blue-collar work, in this case the
transport industry, where the share of employment is relatively steady.
Table 16 looks at changes in the structure of employment by
occupation in France over a thirty year period and the results reported
here are consistent with those reported by the OECD (1994a, page 11-
13).  There is no sign of any acceleration in the rate of change in the
structure of employment by occupation.  In particular, the rate of
decline in the share of blue collar employment over the period 1982-92
is very similar to the rate of decline over the period 1975-82.  Over the
period 1962-75 the share of agricultural employment alone was
declining at a similar rate to agricultural and blue collar employment
combined over the latter two periods.  In common with the UK and the
US, the only break in trend in the 1980s is the very modest decline in
the share of clerical employment, following expansion in the previous
two periods.  The share of employment of the sales and service
occupations shows little change over the whole thirty year period.
Overall, the general trends in France over the period 1962-92 look very
similar to those reported for the UK over the period 1951-91 (Figure
3). 
Table 17 reports the results of matching as far as possible US data
on employment by occupation with the UK’s Standard Occupational
Classification (SOC). Only by making the data comparable in this way
can one be more confident about comparing like with like.  Each of
278 job titles in the US post-1983 occupational classification were
assigned to one of the 22 sub-major categories in the UK SOC.  US
data for 1983 and 1993 were then mapped onto the UK SOC.  The
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slightly different dates for the US (1983-93) and the UK (1981-91) in
Table 17 reflect the availability of consistent data from the two
countries.  
The main differences between the UK and US classifications
relate to the managerial and administrative, sales and personal services
and other manual occupational categories:   
a. Like most countries the US continues to have a separate category
for agricultural and related workers.  The UK SOC does not.
Farmers are counted as managers (SOC 1.2), farm workers are
counted in the other manual category (SOC 9.1) and gardeners
are counted as skilled manual workers (SOC 5.2).
b. Like most countries the US counts the owners or managers of
shops as sales workers, but the SOC counts then as managers
(SOC 1.2).
c. Many ‘service’ workers in the US, including cleaners and kitchen
workers, would be classified in the ‘other’ category in the UK
(SOC 9.2).  This category in the UK also includes postal workers,
who are counted as clerical employees in the US.
d. Even within the top occupations, the US puts accountants, for
example, into the managerial category, while the UK puts them
into the professional category (SOC 2.4).
Given the difficulties in exactly matching occupations, small
differences between the US and the UK figures in Table 17 should not
be over-emphasised.
In the early 1980s Britain had a much higher share of manual
employment than in the US, and a much lower share of professional
and technical employment, and of sales and service employment.  By
the early 1990s the UK's structure of employment by occupation had
converged on that in the US.  Indeed, the similarity between the
proportions employed in the three broadest categories in Table 17 by
the early 1990s is striking.
However, this broad picture needs elaboration.  The UK had a
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higher proportion of its workforce employed as managers or owners of
service establishments, but a significantly smaller proportion in
professional and technical employment.  The UK still had a higher
proportion of its workforce in clerical employment, but a similar
proportion employed in the personal and protective service occupations
and as sales workers.  The US had a higher proportion employed as
sales representatives.  The UK had a significantly higher proportion
employed as craft workers  (in manufacturing) when compared with the
US, but a very similar proportion employed as operatives and drivers
(that is semi-skilled manual employment).  The US had a slightly
higher proportion employed in unskilled manual jobs.  These
differences in the structure of manual employment are interesting and
primarily reflect the different mix in US manufacturing, which relies
more on a strong cadre of managerial, professional and technical staff
matched with a large semi-skilled workforce, but with fewer craftsmen.
When looking at changes across time, the direction of change has
been the same in the two countries, that is, the declining  share of
manual employment and the rising share of managerial, professional
and technical employment.  The UK saw a more rapid shift in this
direction over the period in question.  Important exceptions to note for
both countries are the relatively constant shares of employment in the
construction trades (SOC 5.1) and for drivers (SOC 8.2).  As noted
before these are two areas of manual employment which are not in
secular decline.
Tables 18 and 19 present data on the structure of employment by
occupation in the US and the UK for men and women respectively.
The similarities in the employment structure overall by the early 1990s
hide important differences between the genders.  A higher proportion
of men in the UK are employed in managerial and administrative
positions (including owners and managers of service establishments).
A significantly higher proportion of American women are employed in
professional and technical occupations.  A higher proportion of
American men are employed in relatively low skilled personal services
occupations as sales workers and in unskilled manual jobs, but a lower
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proportion of American women are in such jobs when compared with
the UK.  Overall, the US labour market seems less gender segregated
than the UK labour market.
Table 20 presents this information in a slightly different way, by
calculating the proportion of each country’s civilian employment-
population ratio accounted for by the different occupations.  When
presented this way it can be shown that between 1983 and 1993 the
proportion of all adult Americans employed in manual, blue collar jobs
hardly altered.  Three-quarters of the increase in the employment-
population ratio in the US occurred as a result of the expansion of
managerial, professional and technical jobs.  The UK’s shortfall in its
employment-population ratio was the result of lower employment
across many of the occupational groups, including the professional and
technical occupations and semi- and unskilled manual occupations.
To finish this section an analysis is undertaken for the UK and the
US similar to one in Robinson (1994).  The occupations in the UK
SOC are ranked according to the level of earnings in each occupation.
This is in order to identify four categories of employment ranging from
high paid managerial and professional jobs, down to low paid service
and unskilled manual jobs.  Changes in the proportion of total
employment falling into these categories are then traced across time for
the US and the UK.
Table 21 reports median earnings for each of the major
occupations in the UK SOC for men and women separately.  Three of
the nine categories are split in two because of the very sharp differences
in the types of jobs contained within them.  The four categories of
occupation by pay in Table 22 were arrived at by identifying:
a. For the first category, those occupations where median pay was
above the upper quartile for the whole earnings distribution.
b. For the second category, those occupations where median pay
was between the median and the upper quartile for the whole
earnings distribution.
c. For the third category, those occupations where median pay was
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between the median and the lower quartile for the whole earnings
distribution.
d. For the fourth category, those occupations where median pay was
below the lower quartile for the whole earnings distribution.
The third category, which turns out to be by far the largest,
embraces what the Americans would refer to as ‘middle class’ jobs,
that is skilled and semi-skilled manual jobs (especially for men) and
clerical jobs (especially for women) and also owners and managers of
service establishments.  The purpose of this analysis then is to cast light
on the so-called ‘disappearance’ of these kinds of jobs, and what jobs
are replacing them. 
Rosenthal (1995) conducted a similar, but more finely
disaggregated, analysis of the US labour market using OES data and
without carrying out a separate analysis for men and women.  Table 22
reports the results of the analysis used here which allows for a
comparison of UK and US data.
Table 22 shows the decline in ‘middle class’ jobs in Britain and
the US over the periods shown.  In Britain their share fell by five
percentage points and in the US by three percentage points over a
decade, reflecting the significant decline in the share of manual
employment and the more modest decline in clerical employment.  In
both Britain and the US this share has been taken up by professional,
managerial and technical jobs which on average pay significantly more.
In neither the UK nor the US has there been an increase in the share of
employment in lower paying occupations. 
Rosenthal (1995) reports a modest increase in the share of lower
paying occupations in the US, but with higher paid occupations still
increasing their share at twice the rate of the lower occupations.  This
conclusion is based on an analysis of OES data which suffer from the
drawbacks discussed earlier.  The two results can be reconciled by
saying that the proportion of dependent jobs which are in the lower
service occupations has risen modestly, but the proportion of all
Americans employed in the lower service occupations has not altered
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significantly over the period 1983-93.  Table 22 reveals no signs of any
strong bipolarisation in employment patterns, that is the replacement
of ‘middle class’ jobs by managerial, professional and technical jobs
and low level service jobs in almost equal measure.  Rather the bulk of
the growth is in managerial, professional and technical jobs.
In terms of comparing the structure of employment in the two
countries in the early 1990s there are signs of convergence.  The UK
still has a higher share of employment in ‘middle class’ jobs reflecting
the greater proportion of the workforce employed in both skilled
manual (craft) and clerical jobs.  By contrast, it has a much lower
proportion employed in highly paid professional and technical jobs.
The overall share of employment in lower paid service and semi- and
unskilled manual jobs is similar in both countries.  These overall
patterns again hide significant gender differences, with the US having
a much higher proportion of women employed in ‘high paid’ jobs and
conversely a smaller proportion in ‘low paid’ jobs.  A higher
proportion of American men are employed in lower paid occupations
and fewer in ‘middle class’ skilled manual and clerical jobs.  For
women in both the UK, but more especially in the US, the structure of
employment has been changing more rapidly than for men.
4. EMPLOYMENT CHANGE AND THE DEMAND FOR
QUALIFICATIONS
It is now possible to draw together some of the analysis from the
previous sections.  There is a general shift in the structure of
employment away from manual jobs in the primary and manufacturing
industries towards managerial, professional and technical jobs in the
business, financial, public and social services.  The share of
employment in lower paid service occupations is relatively constant.
There are no signs of any acceleration in the rate of change in
employment structure by industry for 10 OECD countries, and no signs
of any acceleration in the rate of change in employment by occupation
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for the UK, the US and France.  In fact, following sharp changes in the
structure of employment in the US in the 1970s and in the UK in the
early 1980s, the pace of change appears to have abated.
The changes which have occurred in the structure of employment
by occupation point unambiguously to an increase in the demand for
higher educational qualifications which the expanding managerial,
professional and technical occupations often require.  However, the
pace of change is such that the increased demands appear to be
incremental rather than necessitating a drastic expansion of provision
of post-school education. 
Robinson and Manacorda (1996) looks at the change in the
occupational and educational structure of employment in Britain over
the period 1984-94.  It shows that changes in the occupational
structure of employment can only explain a modest part of the increase
in the holding of qualifications by the employed workforce.  On the
other hand, the increase in the proportion of the workforce with
different qualifications over the period 1984-94 can predict with
remarkable accuracy the structure of the occupations by qualification
in 1994, implying that the increased holding of qualifications by each
successive age group simply results in employers of each occupation
upping their educational requirements as would be suggested by the
credentialist hypothesis.  The predictability of this process argues
against an interpretation based on skill biased changes in the demand
for labour, which would be expected to have a differential impact
across occupations.  These are stark conclusions, suggesting that the
outputs of the education and training system in Britain over the period
1984-94 did not merely keep pace with labour market changes, but
allowed employers to hire more qualified people for what in the data
look like essentially the same jobs.
Table 23 reports a similar shift-share analysis for the US to that
performed on British data and reported in Robinson and Manacorda
(1996).  In this analysis all 278 job titles which make up the US
occupational classification were assigned to an educational category
reflecting the typical requirements for the jobs contained within that
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sub-occupation.  The changes in employment by occupation over the
period 1983-93 can then be used to map the changes in the
requirements for different levels of educational attainment.  Table 23
uses four educational categories ranging from higher educational
qualifications to post-secondary technical qualifications, to jobs
requiring extensive work related training, and finally jobs requiring the
minimum in terms of formal education and/or limited on-the-job
training.  In Table 23 these four categories are broadly matched to the
National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) levels used to inform the
debate on educational reform in the UK.
The changes in educational requirements mapped out in Table 23
are as strikingly modest as those reported in Robinson and Manacorda
(1996).  Over a decade the proportion of jobs requiring higher or post-
secondary education increased by just under three percentage points,
and the proportion of jobs requiring high school graduation or less
education fell by two percentage points.  There was also a modest
decline in the proportion of jobs requiring extensive work-related
training, reflecting the declining share of employment in skilled manual
jobs.  This analysis uses OES data which excludes the self employed.
With self employment expanding more rapidly amongst managers and
professionals, Table 23 will slightly understate the increased
requirement for higher qualifications.
More importantly, the analysis does not take into account the
increase in the demand for qualifications within occupations.  But then
it is not possible to know whether if we observe an increase in the
proportion of clerical workers, for example, holding higher educational
qualifications, this reflects an increase in the demands made in the job,
or simply that employers are using qualifications to screen applicants,
and graduates are being required to accept such jobs because they
cannot find work which will fully utilise their qualifications.  These are
the issues discussed more fully in Robinson and Manacorda (1996),
and in Beduwe and Robinson (1996) which reports results from six
European countries.
It is interesting to compare Table 23 with Table 22.  Many of the
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jobs which are in the ‘third quartile’ in Table 22 are in the bottom
educational category in Table 23.  These are the routine manual and
clerical jobs which pay reasonably well, but which demand few formal
educational qualifications.  These jobs are a declining share of the
total.  This is an important component of the ‘hollowing out’ of
‘middle class’ jobs referred to in much of the debate in the US.
However, the rate of decline should not be over-emphasised.
One interesting feature of Table 23 is that it makes it clear that the
changing occupational structure of employment is increasing the
demand for higher qualifications delivered through full time higher
education, and not intermediate skills and qualifications delivered
through extensive work based training programmes.  The UK’s
education and training system has been evolving along ‘North
American’ lines, with a sharp increase in enrolment in full time further
and higher education.  This direction of change seems completely
correct when considered in terms of the changing structure of
employment.
An important area of contrast between the ‘North American’
model of educational participation, towards which the UK is evolving,
and the ‘continental’ model, is the prevalence of part time working
amongst students.  Table 24 charts this and shows the significant
increase in the proportion of UK students holding part time jobs.  For
teenagers the UK had by the early 1990s converged on the US and
Canada with over a third of students at any one point in time holding
a part time job.  There was still a significant shortfall amongst young
adults in higher education, where only one in five in the UK held a job
at any one point in time in the early 1990s compared with around half
in the US and Canada.  This may reflect the higher proportion of
British students in higher education studying away from home, where
it may be more difficult to tap into informal job networks, as well as
the more generous financial support offered to higher education
students in the UK.  Nevertheless, the contrast between the English
speaking countries and the continental European countries is striking.
The North American pattern almost certainly has significant
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advantages, in that individuals matching full time education and part
time work come out of the system with qualifications and also, through
their work, practical skills and experience (and an employer’s
reference) which will probably enhance their employability.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The pace of change in the structure of employment by industry and
occupation does not appear to be accelerating.  In the UK in the early
1990s the structure of employment by industry was changing more
slowly than in the early 1980s.  In the US the structure of employment
by occupation showed less change over the period 1983-93 than during
the period 1973-82.  In France, as in the UK, the structure of
employment by occupation seems to be changing at a steady pace,
decade by decade.  Aside from the early 1980s, Britain has not seen a
significantly higher rate of change in the structure of employment than
other OECD countries.  The direction of employment change across
countries seems very similar.  Manual jobs are a declining share of total
employment.  Skilled manual jobs in Britain have been declining at a
similar rate to unskilled manual jobs.  Semi-skilled manual jobs,
including those for transport operatives, have been declining more
slowly.  The same is true in the US.  These trends reflect the declining
share in total employment of the primary and manufacturing industries.
Managerial, professional and technical jobs are increasing their
share of employment, reflecting the shift in the industrial structure
toward financial and business services and the public and social
services, and for the UK at least the increased proportion of the
workforce employed in managerial and administrative positions within
each industry.
Assessing the trend in clerical employment across the OECD is
difficult because of differences in occupational classifications across
countries, but in the UK, the US and France there was a modest decline
in the share of routine clerical employment in the 1980s and early
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1990s.  This is the one break in trend with past experience.  The share
of employment in the sales and services occupations in most countries
is broadly constant, though in the UK the personal service occupations
are the one less skilled occupational group whose share of employment
is increasing.  However, middle ranking manual (and clerical) jobs are
being replaced primarily by more highly paid jobs at the top end of the
occupational spectrum.
The direction of employment change in the US is little different
from other countries, though the rate of change in the structure of
employment by industry and occupation was somewhat slower than in
a number of other OECD countries in the 1980s.  The US appeared to
experience more structural change in the 1970s.  The US has not in the
1980s expanded employment disproportionately at the lower end of
the labour market in low paid sales, service or unskilled manual
occupations.  By the early 1990s the US did not have a significantly
higher proportion of its workforce in lower paid occupations when
compared with the UK.  However, this overall picture did hide
significant differences by gender, in that the US has a smaller
proportion of women employed in these occupations but a higher
proportion of men employed in low skill jobs.  This leaves open the
possibility that the American welfare system is associated with greater
pressure on men to accept low paid jobs.  However, it needs to be
stressed that the US in the 1980s did not see an increase in the overall
share of the workforce employed in such jobs.
Continental European countries such as France have significantly
higher unemployment rates and lower employment-population ratios
when compared with the US.  This shortfall in employment
opportunities is related to lower levels of employment across the
services sector and across all the ‘white collar’ occupations.  Policies
under the heading of product or labour market deregulation might help
generate jobs in the distribution industry and in the business and
financial services or public and social services.  This would include
jobs in the less well paid sales and service occupations as well as jobs
in the highly paid managerial, professional and technical occupations.
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Given the heavy incidence of unemployment amongst the young and
women in countries such as France, a strategy which accepted that
some employment generation would occur in the lower skilled sections
of the labour market, which disproportionately employ these
demographic groups, should not be seen as unwelcome.
The shift in employment away from manual jobs towards
managerial, professional and technical occupations unambiguously
implies an increase in the demand for higher qualifications.  However,
straightforward analysis for the US reported here, for the UK reported
in Robinson and Manacorda (1996), and for six European countries
reported in Beduwe and Robinson (1996), suggests a rather modest
increase in demand.  The changes which have occurred in the
occupational structure of employment, which might be taken to proxy
changes in the net demand for labour by skill, would seem to require
an increase of no more than a few percentage points each decade in the
proportion of the workforce holding higher qualifications, and a
decline of a few percentage points each decade in the proportion of the
workforce with few or no formal qualifications.
It could be argued that these measures of change focusing on
quite aggregated categories of industries and occupations is failing to
pick up more subtle changes going on at the sub-industry or occupation
level.  Most of the increase in wage inequality in the US and Britain
has occurred within occupations.  Economists have so far been able to
say relatively little about what might be causing these changes at a
more disaggregated level.
A final point to stress is that the data published by the ILO and
used by the OECD and others on the distribution of employment by
occupation are not readily comparable across countries.  Interpretation
of the data is rendered problematic by the differences in the manner by
which countries classify jobs into different occupational categories.  
The question is often posed, how can displaced manual workers
possibly find jobs in the expanding managerial, professional and
technical occupations?  A similar question could have been posed in
the 1950s or 1960s in the OECD countries in relation to the difficulty
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of displaced agricultural workers finding jobs in the expanding
managerial, professional and technical occupations.  The direction and
pace of change in the last two decades really seems to differ little from
previous post-war decades for most countries.  In practice few
displaced farm or manual workers do make that transition.  It is their
sons and daughters who do. 
Changes in the qualifications structure of the workforce occur
primarily across generations, as the children of people with few formal
qualifications attain higher qualifications and their parents leave the
labour force.  This process is usually a gradual one.  And this raises the
possibility that sharp changes in the structure of employment over a
relatively short space of time can throw the labour market into a
position of structural imbalance.  But over time as the changes in the
structure of employment moderate and the new generation respond to
the changed employment opportunities by embracing the need for
higher qualifications, these imbalances can work their way out.
This seems a reasonable description of the British labour market
over the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s.  It might well fit
for other OECD countries as well.  In the early 1980s Britain witnessed
a very severe recession with sharp job losses in manufacturing industry
and for manual workers.  However, by the mid-to-late 1980s the pace
of change in the structure of employment had moderated again.  The
recession of the early 1990s saw less dramatic shifts in the employment
structure by industry.  In the meantime, in the late 1980s young people
began to vote with their feet to enter further and higher education in
much greater numbers, as documented by Robinson (1995).  This
began to feed through into the stock of qualifications in the workforce
in the early 1990s.  As a consequence of this moderation of the change
in the structure of employment, and the supply response in education,
by the early 1990s unemployment rates by qualification had evened out
again significantly in Britain (Nickell and Bell, 1995).
The significant dislocation caused by the early 1980s recession in
Britain is to a large extent ‘water under the bridge’.  The pace of
change in the structure of employment is now moderate enough and the
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supply response in education great enough to be sanguine that a
downward path for unemployment in Britain in the rest of the 1990s
will not be spoiled by any severe imbalance between the demand for,
and supply of, labour in different occupational groups with different
educational requirements.  It is again worth stressing that reasonably
well paid manual jobs in the construction and transport industries are
not in secular decline, and with so many jobs in the primary sector and
in manufacturing having already been eliminated, manual employment
seems unlikely to decline at the same rate in the 1990s as in the 1980s.
There is a less satisfactory side to this ‘water under the bridge’
argument.  Many older manual workers (a good proportion of them
doing skilled jobs even if they were formally unqualified) displaced
in the early 1980s recession have left the labour force entirely, as
documented by Schmitt and Wadsworth (1994).  This cohort is now
past retirement age.  The early 1990s recession also saw a sharp fall in
male employment and economic activity rates.  Older manual workers
displaced during recessions are the least likely to find alternative
employment.  For many any recovery in employment may come too
late to avoid the transition into inactivity.  A robust recovery in
employment will be associated with a levelling off in economic activity
rates for men and a rise for women.  But it seems unlikely that many of
those older workers who are already inactive will be drawn back into
the labour market.
The recovery in the UK economy over the period 1993-96 was
driven by a relatively expansionary monetary policy and a significant
depreciation of the exchange rate which produced an export and
manufacturing led increase in output.  In turn, this has been associated
with a very significant slowdown in the rate of change of employment
by industry and occupation.  If the overall stance and balance of
macroeconomic policy in Britain in the second half of the 1990s is got
right and there are no further shocks to the economy, we can expect
only modest further changes in the employment structure.  With the
stock of qualifications in the workforce rising strongly there is reason
to think that unemployment could continue to fall.  
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ENDNOTE
1. This measure of change is used here because it is the measure
used by the OECD (1994a) and this paper wishes to highlight any
discrepancies with OECD’s analysis.
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TABLE 1
Unemployment rates and employment-population ratios for 10 OECD
countries, early 1980s S early 1990s
Unemployment rate % Civilian employment as a %
of population 15-64
Men Women Total Men Women Total
Sweden 1981 2.3 2.6 2.5 84.5 73.3 79.0
1992 6.1 4.1 5.2 78.0 75.8 76.9
Japan 1981 2.3 2.2 2.3 87.2 54.1 70.5
1992 2.1 2.2 2.1 87.8 60.6 74.2
Norway 1982 2.4 3.1 2.7 83.4 62.4 73.1
1992 6.6 5.1 5.9 74.8 67.1 71.1
US 1983 9.6 9.2 9.4 73.9 55.9 64.8
1993 7.1 6.5 6.8 76.9 64.4 70.9
UK 1981 10.0 8.8 9.5 78.6 53.7 66.1
1991 9.2 7.2 8.2 75.5 61.6 68.6
Canada 1981 7.0 8.3 7.6 79.5 53.9 66.7
1991 10.8 9.7 10.3 74.2 61.4 67.8
Germany 1980 2.5 4.3 3.2 79.6 50.6 65.0
1991 5.0 6.3 4.2 73.8 54.5 64.3
Finland 1982 5.4 5.2 5.3 75.7 68.6 72.0
1992 15.2 10.7 13.1 64.6 63.2 63.9
France 1982 5.8 10.5 7.8 72.2 48.5 60.9
1992 7.9 12.8 10.1 66.0 51.1 58.5
Spain 1980 10.4 12.8 11.1 69.9 28.1 48.8
1992 14.3 25.5 18.4 62.2 31.4 46.8
Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics.
